In mid-December 2015, scattered actions took place across Russia: truckers protested against the Platon system, and in Moscow, people demonstrated against the expansion of paid parking and the cancellation of public hearings. On December 12, Constitution Day, riot police broke up pickets on Pushkin Square. Against this backdrop, political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky and St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly deputy Boris Vishnevsky discussed on Radio Svoboda what Vladimir Putin fears and whether these protests could lead to a change of power.
“Social, Not Political”
Belkovsky characterized the situation as “a system of scattered social protests,” emphasizing that they contain no demands for a change of power. In his view, the Communist Party deputies who supported those fighting paid parking are meant to “neutralize popular protest”—such, he assessed, has been the party’s role for 20 years. He also noted that A Just Russia and other parliamentary parties are trying to attach themselves to the actions, since Duma elections are near and support for Kremlin initiatives over the past two years has seriously discredited them. Belkovsky does not yet see potential for real political consolidation.
Vishnevsky, by contrast, stated that scattered pockets of socio-economic protest “will inevitably lead to political protest.” He referred to his article on “the battle of the refrigerator and the television” and expressed faith that changes in citizens’ consciousness will begin under the pressure of economic hardship. Belkovsky objected: the refrigerator matters, but not decisively; the collapse of respect for authority is an essential precondition for regime change, but for now respect is largely intact, and all social protest appeals to that same authority.
On the Kremlin’s Reaction and the External Factor
Responding to a question about the authorities’ reaction to the protests, Belkovsky cited the events of 2011–2012: after the actions on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue, the Kremlin made concessions, including restoring gubernatorial elections and single-mandate districts. According to him, after returning to power, Putin set the task of preventing a new “blackmail from the street.” The analyst argued that Putin is not afraid of today’s protests, believing he dealt with them at their peak, and that liberal protest leaders can be bought.
Vishnevsky linked the worsening economic situation to foreign policy. He said that the St. Petersburg parliament had discussed the suspension of production at Toyota, Nissan, and Bosch plants due to disruptions in component supplies from Turkey, and called this a result of the authorities’ actions. According to him, when constituents complain about hardship, he reminds them of the ruble’s exchange rate and prices two years ago: “Two years ago there was no Crimea, no annexation, no war in eastern Ukraine—here is the direct result.” He also cited Alfa-Bank’s forecast of 80 rubles per dollar at the start of the year.
Belkovsky, for his part, spoke about how, in his opinion, after the events in Kyiv in February 2014, Putin lost his illusions about partnership with the West and believes that only brute force can compel the West to negotiate a new division of the world.
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